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Abstract：Are there material and moral connections between wealth and moral 
values? Do people require a certain level of material well-being to be moral? Can 
people choose freely to abide by moral values when their physical or material 
well-being are in jeopardy? Can people be expected to follow moral values when 
their self-interests would be advanced by not adhering to moral values?  Does 
technology create impersonal relationships that make immoral acts easier to 
perform? Can ethical reasoning be taught? This paper explores insights from 
ancient China, especially the Lüshi Chunqiu, to argue that moral education is an 
ongoing developmental process that people must constantly cultivate to value the 
appropriate moral action for the particular context at hand. Some contemporary 
approaches to the importance of teaching ethical problem solving will be reviewed. 
 
Are there material and moral connections between wealth and moral values? Do 
people require a certain level of material well-being to be moral? Can people choose 
freely to abide by moral values when their physical or material well-being is in 
jeopardy? Can people be expected to follow moral values when their self-interests 
would be advanced by not adhering to moral values? Does technology create 
impersonal relationships that make immoral acts easier to perform? Can ethical 
problem solving be taught? This paper explores insights from ancient China, 
especially the Lüshi Chunqiu吕氏春秋, to argue that moral education is an ongoing 
developmental process that people must constantly cultivate to value the appropriate 
moral action for the particular context at hand. Some contemporary approaches to the 
importance of teaching ethical problem solving will be reviewed.
 1
 
Influenced by the four aims of life from the Upanishads, Abraham Maslow 
proposed that people=s most basic needs had to be met before they could mature and 
develop social and moral values. 2  Many deontological, duty based moralities, 
advance the notion that people can and must adhere to the moral values in the face of 
immediate personal adversity or future retaliation for doing the right thing. There may 
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be a contextual truth to both perspectives. On the one hand from a developmental 
perspective people have to achieve and maintain a degree of physical and material 
well-being to attain the requisite level of mature understanding required to acquire 
moral values, and to develop the will power to behave according to those values. 
After attaining a high level of maturation people are, then, in a position to make 
sacrifices, to suspend their personal self-interests, to do their duty for its own sake 
regardless of the consequences or social repercussions. The deontological notion of 
doing duty for duty’s sake is not unique to Kant. It is found in many warrior cultures 
such as the Zulu, Vikings, Kshartriya caste and so on; all the warrior cultures 
understand the need for people but especially the warriors to do their duty, stand their 
ground and sacrifice for the sake of others. In order to do your duty for duty’s sake, 
people must achieve a level of maturation to be able to make personal sacrifices, and 
to override drives and other organic processes tied to survival to do the right thing for 
the right reason. They must override; their self-interests, when necessary to do the 
right thing. If people are not given the material means to sustain a healthy life, then 
they will be far less likely to be able to perform moral actions or even participate in 
positive social relationships. 
The infamous case of the Ik (pronounced ‘eek’) in Uganda Africa is a case in 
point. After the Ik, a hunting and gathering people, were forced to live on a 
reservation and the feeble attempts to teach the Ik farming techniques had failed, the 
Ik were reduced to a very low level of poverty and extreme starvation such that most 
social and moral relationships had broken down.3 They were no longer able to 
cooperate with each other, let alone work together for a common good. So, from their 
experience we can conclude that without sufficient resources to sustain life, people 
cannot be expected to override biological, survival drives for the greater good of 
social and moral purposes. For people to be moral they must have sufficient resources 
to sustain life and sufficient emotional maturity to create, hold and maintain ethical 
values; without the resources they cannot be good. For morality to be put into practice, 
society must achieve a high level of well-being. 
 
I. Definitions and Two Assumptions: Value and Free Will 
 
A few definitions are in order. Absolutists often speak as if there were only one 
system of morality. In fact there are many moralities or belief systems that judge 
human actions to be morally good or bad. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that studies 
moralities. Ethics is an abstract endeavor that passes judgment on the belief systems 
of morality. Hence the importance of teaching ethical problem solving is that it allows 
people a means by which they can critique and correct insufficient or irrational 
moralities. Learning to use ethical problem solving also assists others to decide when 
to intervene as a witness to immoral acts. 
Any discussion of ethics and morality is based on the assumption that people 
believe that some things are more or less valuable than others, and that people believe 
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that they have the ability to choose one course of action over another. I do not have 
the time or space required to argue that people can and do believe in the relative value 
of things. The fact that people do believe in the relative value of things should be 
readily available to most people. People do have values and their moral values are 
some of the most cherished and respected of values. The question of whether or not 
people have the freedom of will power to make choices is another hotly debated topic 
that cannot be resolved here. For the time being, let us assume that most people are 
able to control their choices. Free will must be a reality, if any discussion of ethics is 
going to be meaningful. People must have the free will to choose, and they must be 
able to choose the moral or good alternative. If people cannot choose to be moral or if 
people do not have the free will to choose at all, then making moral choices would be 
impossible. 
 
II. Immoral Acts 
 
The consequences of immoral acts can have and have had far-reaching even global 
consequences. Immoral acts are performed within a wider context of general social 
harmony.  Immoral people have little or no regard for the negative consequences of 
their actions and sometimes they intend and celebrate the negative results. Although 
many times immoral acts are specifically intended to harm a particular person, 
generally speaking, many immoral acts are not intended to harm anyone particular 
person nor is the expected result of the action intended to benefit the person 
performing the action. For example, mass murder, suicide bombings, and violence 
against ethnic out-groups bring little or no benefit to the perpetrators, and they are 
directed at a group. After being named by Fortune magazine as the most innovative 
company for six consecutive years, Enron collapsed, in 2001, under the weight of its 
immoral accounting practices and fraudulent shell companies. A year later, in 2002, 
WorldCom improperly accounted for $3.8 billion in operating expenses and filed for 
bankruptcy. In 2008, we saw the collapse of several large investment firms such as 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and various other financial institutions 
that were directly linked to immoral or illegal acts. These financial collapses were 
correlated with greed and a lack of concern for others in an impersonal, technological 
environment. The list can be developed further. Most wars in world history were 
motivated out of excessive self-interest, greed for wealth and power, and a lack of 
concern for the well-being of other people. The impacts of these wars and the other 
events have been far-reaching, even global. 
The impact of what at first appear to be small scale immoral acts, such as one 
person lying to, or cheating, or hurting another person, have an insidious way of 
creeping into and tainting the overall social context. Immoral actions occur within the 
context of interpersonal harmony, trust, and social order. The impact of relatively 
small scale immoral actions can have far-reaching and even global ramifications, 
especially when technology can help spread the actions’ influence far, wide and 
quickly. 
Ancient China provides a unique literary culture with values and perspectives 
that differ from our own contemporary points of view that can be employed to inform 
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our discussion of ethics and the study of moralities. Can ancient Chinese texts teach 
us anything about ethical problem solving that we can apply to our circumstances 
today? 
 
III. The Lüshi chunqiu 吕氏春秋 on Valuing What is Fitting 
 
To study the Lüshi chunqiu (Lü-shih ch'un-ch'iu) or The Spring and Autumn [Annals] 
of Master Lü is to enter into the tumultuous but progressive times of the Warring 
States period (403-221 before the Common Era, hereafter BCE) in China.4 This period 
is commonly referred to as Athe pre-Qin period because of the fundamental changes 
which occurred after the Qin 秦 unification. The Lüshi chunqiu was probably 
completed, in 241 BCE, by various scholars at the estate of Lü Buwei (Lü Pu-wei 吕
不韋), also known as Lord Wenxin文信侯, the prime minister of Qin 秦 and tutor to 
the Qin child King, Zheng.5 It is one of the few pre-Qin texts that dates itself. The 
date, though not precise, is given in the xuyi 序意 chapter.6 A decade after the 
                                               
4 John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. See Richard Wilhelm, trans. 1979 reprint. Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We, 
with a new introduction by Wolfgang Bauer. Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs Verlag. The first 
edition of the translation was reviewed by Paul Pelliot, 1930, a review of Richard Wilhelm’s 
Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We, T’oung Pao, XXVII. Also see Eugen Feifel. 1975. “A 
Review of Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We” Philosophy East and West, 25/1. Some of the 
more significant commentaries among the Chinese editions are: Yang Jialuo. ed. 1977. Lüshi 
chunqiu jishi deng wushu, contains Xu Weiyu’s commentary. Taibei: Ding Wen Publishing Co. 
Chen Qiyou, ed. 1984. Lüshi chunqiu jiaoshi. Shanghai: Xuelin Publishing Co. Chang 
Shuangdi, et al., ed. 1986. Lüshi chunqiu shizhu. Gulin: Gulin Wenshi Publishing Co. 
5 Lü Buwei sponsored thousands of scholars and compiled them in The Lüshi chunqiu. For an 
historical background and analysis of the text in general see the following. James D. Sellmann. 
1998. “Lüshi chunqiu,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, Routledge, and 
1995. “Lü Buwei,” in Great Thinkers of the Eastern World, ed. Ian McGreal, HarperCollins.  
Michael Carson, and Michael Loewe. 1993. “Lü shih ch’un ch’iu,” in Early Chinese Texts A 
Bibliographical Guide. ed. Michael Loewe. Early China Monograph Series No. 2, The Society 
for the Study of Early China, and the Institute of East Asian Studies. Berkeley: University of 
California. John Louton. 1981. The Lü-shi chun-qiu: An Ancient Chinese Political Cosmology, 
University of Washington, unpublished dissertation. For a detailed discussion of Lü Buwei’s 
sponsorship of the Lüshi chunqiu see the following. Sima Qian. 1975. “Lü Buwei ‘liezhuan’,” 
in Shiji xuan. Taipei: Wenyi Publishing Co. Qian Mu. 1956. Xian Qin zhuzi xinian. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, pp. 485-489. Guo Moruo. 1962. Shi pipanshu. Peking: Koxue 
chubanshe, pp. 387-460. Derk Bodde. 1967. China’s First Unifier, A Study in the Ch’in 
Dynasty as seen in the Life of Li Ssu. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp. 1-22. 
These are all discussed at length by John Louton. The Lü-shi chun-qiu: An Ancient Chinese 
Political Cosmology. pp. 22 ff. Bodde’s later understanding is detailed in Denis Twitchett and 
Michael Loewe, eds. 1986. The Cambridge History of China, Volume I The Chin and Han 
Empires. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 40-43, and 95. 
6 The Postscript chapter [or xuyi 序意] tells us that the work was completed “in the eighth 
year of Qin ...”. There is a debate still unresolved as to what year that would be. Hu Shi (Hu 
Shih) and others use King Zheng’s enthronement to propose that “the eighth year” refers to 238 
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completion of the Lüshi chunqiu, King Zheng began the ensuing nine years of fervent 
warfare that led to his unification of the empire in 221 B.C.E. Before the political 
unification, the Lüshi chunqiu (LSCQ) created a philosophical consolidation.7 The 
Lüshi chunqiu (LSCQ) performed an important function in the literary and political 
education of the young King Zheng. More importantly, it provided a philosophical 
understanding of and justification for a unified empire which left its mark on the 
young King, and subsequent Han philosophy. After the unification of the empire, 
King Zheng took the title Qin shihuangdi (First-generation Emperor of Qin 秦始皇
帝), and he established the insignia of water for the imperial emblems, extinguishing 
the fire emblems of the Zhou court. He did this by employing concepts from Lüshi 
chunqiu's yingtong (Responding and Identifying應通) chapter that describes the 
                                                                                                                
BCE. Hu Shi. 1961. “Du Lüshi chunqiu” in Hu Shi wencun. Volume. III, ed. Pu Jialin. Taipei: 
Far Eastern Book Co. Qian Mu’s argument is more convincing; he uses the year of Lü Buwei’s 
appointment, 249 BCE, to begin the calculation. So I follow his date of 241. See Qian Mu. 
1977. “Lü Buwei zhushukao,” appended to Yang Jialuo’s preface to Lüshi chunqiu jishi deng 
wushu, no page numbers. Qian Mu’s study is briefly discussed by Kung-chuan Hsiao. 1979. A 
History of Chinese Political Thought. Translated by F.W. Mote. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, p. 557, n. 19. Also see Michael Carson and Michael Loewe. 1993. “Lü shih 
ch’un ch’iu,” in Early Chinese Texts A Bibliographical Guide. 
7 When I speak of a “philosophical consolidation” or a “syncretic philosophy” the reader 
should not be under the impression that these were discrete “schools” of philosophy. The 
different philosophers or masters (zi子) had much to dispute concerning their respective 
understandings of the way (dao 道). For example, Mengzi (Mencius) clearly differentiated his 
alignment with Kongzi (Confucius) verses Mo Di (Mo Ti), Yang Zhu (Yang Chu), and others. 
However, the idea that there were discrete “schools” was advanced by later interpreters, such as 
the author of chapter 32 of the Zhuangzi; Sima Tan and Sima Qian the principal authors of the 
Shiji, and Liu Xiang and Liu Xin. Certainly the “disputers of the dao” had their differences; see 
A.C. Graham. 1989. Disputers of the Tao. La Salle, (Illinois): Open Court. However, they were 
not so much at “war” with each other as later interpreters have led us to believe by imposing 
the “warring states” model on to the so-called “schools” of philosophy. In the arts of rulership 
and statesmanship, it was and is pragmatic to amalgamate various diverse positions. The label 
jia (school 家) was developed by historians and bibliographers primarily to classify the various 
books. During the Han Dynasty, when imperial policy was being directly configured by 
conflicting philosophical schools (now commonly referred to as the Modernists and the 
Reformists) there was an anachronistic tendency to read this kind of contention back into the 
pre-Qin period. During the pre-Qin period, the rulers either did not take the philosophers 
seriously (Kongzi is the classic example) or when the rulers or prime ministers did pay 
attention to academics, they supported a broad spectrum of them which is seen in the Jixia 
Academy’s compilation of the Guanzi, and Lü Buwei’s Lüshi chunqiu (LSCQ).Therefore, when 
I utilize expressions like daojia, fajia, Daoist, or Legalist, I am not contending, nor should the 
reader imply, that there was an organized school or systematic philosophy of “Daoism” or 
so-called “Legalism.” I merely employ those expressions as convenient labels. For the debate 
between the Modernists and Reformists during the Han Dynasty, see Denis Twitchett and 
Michael Loewe, eds. 1986. The Cambridge History of China. Volume I The Ch'in and Han 
Empires, pp. 104-106, 128, 144, and 488-489. Concerning the misleading bibliographical 
classification system, see pp. 651-52. 
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succession of previous dynasties that changed imperial emblems according to the 
timely cycle of the five phases (wuxing 五行). Qin shihuangdi changed the emblems 
to justify his new dynasty.8 
The Guidang貴當 chapter (Valuing What is Fitting, or Prizing What is Fitting 
Guidang according to Knoblock’s translation) provides an analysis of the reasons 
why leaders, that is rulers and ministers, or contemporary managers for that matter, 
need to follow a moral way or dao 道. If the ancient texts are going to be relevant to 
modern life, then I suggest that we understand ourselves today to be the leaders or 
rulers and ministers that can take advantage of LSCQ=s teachings. The examples 
given in the chapter emphasize the importance of the particular context that people 
find themselves in, the importance of maintaining healthy friendships, and the need to 
“plow” or cultivate oneself and others to promote success. 
The Guidang chapter opens with the following counsel to follow the correct 
approach or dao. The illustrious reputation cannot be purposefully sought. It must be 
achieved by following the dao 道. Control of things depends, not on the things, but 
on men. Control of men depends, not on the men, but on the task. Control of the task 
depends, not on the task, but on the feudal lord (or the manager). Control of the feudal 
lord depends, not on them, but on the Son of Heaven (or the executive). Control of the 
Son of Heaven depends, not on him, but on his desires. Control of the desires depends, 
not on the desires, but on the developing character (xing, inborn nature 性 ). 
Developing character is the fundamental consideration in the myriad things and can 
be neither increased nor decreased, for it is what definitively makes each thing the 
thing that it is. This is a constant principle of Heaven and Earth. (Modifying 
Knoblock, p. 620) 
There may be a tendency to want to read the concept of xing (developing 
character 性) as an innate capacity and Knoblock implies this by translating xing as 
“inborn nature.” I argue elsewhere that xing is best understood as an ongoing life 
process.9  The subsequent arguments and examples given in the Guidang 貴當 
chapter emphasize the ongoing, developmental, dynamic and contextual character of 
moral development and ethical problem solving. The chapter goes on to say that the 
moral exemplars, such as Kings Tang and Wu practiced self-cultivation, and the 
world followed their lead. On the other hand immoral tyrants, such as Jie and Zhou 
Xin were contemptuous, and the people rebelled against them. The paragraph 
                                               
8 Qin Shihuangdi is supposed to have adopted the symbol of water to show that he had 
extinguished the Zhou symbol of fire. See Derk Bodde’s discussion of this, and his refutation 
of the criticisms against the claim that Qin did not adopt the symbol of water in Denis 
Twitchett and Michael Loewe, eds. 1986. The Cambridge History of China, vol. I, pp. 77, and 
96-97; for the significance of the water-symbol in the Han dynasty also see, pp. 119, 208, 
729-730 and 737. However, as far as I can tell I am the first one who has drawn a connection 
between this passage in the LSCQ’s yingtong chapter and the First Emperor’s claim to 
legitimacy. 
9 James Sellmann. 2002. Timing and Rulership in “Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. See chapter 2. 
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concludes: “The prince of virtue (junzi 君子) pays close attention to what resides 
within him and to nothing else.” What resides within him is a learned ability to reason 
morally, not an innate capacity. 
For example the chapter goes on to relate a story about an expert physiognomist 
who had an audience with King Zhuang. The physiognomist admits right off that he 
cannot predict a person=s destiny by his physiological appearance, but rather he does 
it by examining the person’s friends. When he examines a commoner and discovers 
that his friends are filial, dutiful and obedient, then he predicts that the person will be 
prosperous and his family will flourish. Likewise the physiognomist does the same 
thing when he examines ministers and rulers, he predicts their destiny by studying 
their friends. Again, the better their friends are the better their destiny is likely to be. 
This provides the basis for a social epistemology for ethical problem solving. Namely, 
people need to be surrounded by successfully moral people to be moral themselves. 
This can be called the practice of correct association. People must associate with other 
people who practice being moral to be moral themselves. Of course this was also 
recognized by Aristotle who had a lot to say about the importance of proper 
friendships and how they promote a person=s ethical development and ultimate 
success for achieving a complete and happy life.10 
Therefore, worthy rulers/leaders give timely audiences to people of moral refinement 
and cultivation, not merely so they will be surrounded by them, but because through 
them they achieve great things. With them important and minor tasks can be 
completed (Modifying Knoblock, p. 621). 
If leaders, executives, managers or even common people are going to be 
successful they need to work with others who are themselves morally upright and 
successful. 
Because aristocrats and rulers, in ancient China, were often fond of losing 
themselves in hunting and racing events, these activities were typically associated 
with irresponsible behavior. The next passage in the chapter proposes that morally 
worthy people can engage in such hunting and racing activities to sharpen their 
thinking, while incompetent people become confused by engaging in such activities. 
This is an interesting point. It is not so much what specific activities people engage in 
that helps them develop, but rather it is the mind-set and attitude that they bring with 
them to engage in the activities that makes a difference regarding the outcome of the 
activity. 
The chapter emphasizes this point with a story about a poor man from Qi who 
loved to hunt, but he was not successful because his hunting dog was no good. He 
could not afford to buy a better dog. So he returned to the fields and dedicated himself 
to plowing. Then he acquired some wealth, could afford to buy a good hunting dog, 
and he became a very successful hunter. The example serves to show that dedication 
and hard work or Aplowing@ pave the way to success.  It also shows that people 
                                               
10 Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random 
House. See the Nicomachean Ethics, book 8. 
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must have a material base; their basic needs must be met. They are able to act freely 
and creatively, to plow or to cultivate themselves to improve their lot in life and to 
better themselves 
From antiquity to the present, there has never been a case of anyone becoming a 
lord-protector without first ‘plowing.’ This is what sets the worthy apart from the 
unworthy. The worthy and unworthy have the same desires as ordinary people. .... 
Wherein they differed was how they pursued their desires. Thus, when a worthy 
leader examines a course of action and finds it improper, he will not follow it, and 
when he considers it proper, he will. Since what he does always follows the dao, 
nothing can harm him. Thus, his accomplishments surpass those of others ten 
thousand fold. (Modifying Knoblock, p. 622 
The authors of the chapter argue that people have to develop their capacity to 
engage in ethical problem solving to do the right thing, at the right time, and in the 
proper manner. When people live in harmony with and according to the moral dao, 
practice right friendship by associating with ethically good people, and they “plow” 
or apply themselves to work hard in a rational manner to achieve their objectives and 
goals, then, people are valuing what is fitting.  
As the Guidang chapter emphasizes, the importance of building and maintaining 
proper, ethical friendships cannot be overstated. Humans need social contact with 
others to become ethical, rational and to develop the skills needed to solve moral 
problems. Without social and moral contact human beings will not and cannot 
develop their personhood as a member of a moral community. To the extent that 
technology creates an artificial Adistance@ and alienation between people, it would 
appear that technology makes it easier for some people to engage in immoral and 
criminal acts because they cannot sense the others’ pain; they cannot empathize or 
sympathize with the unseen, unheard other against whom they are perpetrating the 
immoral or criminal act. Generally speaking it is becoming clear that the present 
generation of youth who were raised on the internet seem to have a lack of concern 
for issues of privacy and personal property, especially when online or on the internet. 
They seem to live in a “cut and paste” world without intellectual property rights. The 
online social networks are providing a context for people to redefine ownership and 
sharing, to redefine personal interaction and privacy. With the advent of electronic 
stock trading and the emerging global economic market place, we have already seen 
the negative global impact of corrupt, immoral and illegal economic practices. This is 
my concern for online, distance education, namely, that with the lack of human 
contact online students, learning at a distance, will not develop sound ethical problem 
solving skills. So I am concerned that education at a distance may not be the best way 
to instill the importance of being moral or learning the processes of solving ethical 
problems. 
 
IV. Solving Ethical Problems 
 
Plato’s dialogue the Meno grapples with the question of whether or not people can 
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learn to be moral. In the end Socrates proposes that being moral cannot be learned. It 
is a gift from the gods or a “… divine dispensation.”11 I hope that is not the case. If 
the ability to be moral is a gift from the gods, then there is a two-sided negative 
consequence. On the one hand someone may obtain the moral gift but cannot 
understand the gift, or worse than that, he cannot perform moral actions. On the other 
hand, someone who does not obtain the gift has no other way to discover the proper 
course of action. But people are moral and ethical. People are able to improve their 
morality and ethics and become better at it. So morality and the ability to solve moral 
problems cannot be a divine gift or innate capacity, it must be something that people 
can learn to do. 
As an educator, a professor and a dean, I believe that people can learn how to 
engage in moral problem solving. Robert J. Sternberg (2010) has constructed an eight 
step model of moral behavior that seems to apply to a variety of ethical problems.12 
“The model identifies the specific skills students need to reason and then behave 
ethically. The skills are taught by active learning—by having students solve 
ethical-reasoning problems, employing the skills they need.” (Sternberg, p. 36) 
Sternberg=s model is based on bystander intervention research. Sternberg points out 
that based on family, school and religious training, we expect bystanders to intervene, 
but this is not the case. In keeping with the above discussion from the Guidang 
chapter, people need to “plow” or work diligently at being moral. Sternberg proposes 
that regardless of the amount of formal training a person might have if that person is 
going to intervene, then she must go through all eight steps in his model to act 
morally. The eight steps are: 
1. Recognize that there is an event to which to react. 2. Define the event as 
having an ethical dimension. 3. Decide that the ethical dimension is significant. 4. 
Take personal responsibility for generating an ethical solution to the problem. 5. 
Figure out what abstract ethical rule(s) might apply to the problem. 6. Decide how 
these abstract rules actually apply to the problem so as to suggest a concrete solution. 
7. Prepare to counteract contextual forces that might lead one not to act in an ethical 
manner. 8. Act (Sternberg, pp. 36-37). To illustrate the model, he employs a simple 
example of one student, John, observing another student, Bill, cheating on an exam. 
First, John has to see Bill cheating and he has to decide that he can potentially do 
something about it. Second, John has to recognize Bill’s actions as immoral. 
Although many would consider cheating to be immoral, some may consider that it is 
alright if Bill can get away with it. Third, John has to decide that Bill’s cheating is 
serious enough that it warrants his attention. Fourth, John has to decide that he is 
personally responsible for taking action to solve this problem. Many times people will 
feel that there is an ethical problem but that they are not personally responsible for the 
solution. Fifth, John has to figure out what rule or rules apply to this problem. He 
                                               
11 Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds. 1980. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ‘Meno,’ pp. 353-384. Socrates concludes 
“…whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation.” p. 384. 
12 Robert J. Sternberg. 2010. “Teaching for Ethical Reasoning in Liberal Education,” Liberal 
Education, 96/3, Summer, 32-37. 
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might decide that the rule to follow is that he should mind his own business. Sixth, 
John has to decide how to apply the rule to the problem so as to find a concrete 
solution. Even though John may believe that he should report Bill for cheating, he 
may not be able to prove that Bill did cheat. Seventh, John has to counteract forces 
that might lead him to reconsider and not take action. For example, John might fear 
being shunned by Bill and others for being a snitch. 
Eighth, the ultimate end of solving ethical problems is not merely about changing 
what a person thinks but also it is about changing how a person takes action. John has 
to go from thinking about what to do to actually doing something. Ethical problem 
solving must lead to moral action. A person requires courage or moral fortitude to do 
the right thing. A high level of motivation is not only required to intervene as a Good 
Samaritan but a high level of motivation is also required to initially perform a good 
moral act, especially moral actions that go against self-interest. 
Solving ethical problems, it would be hoped, can be taught and more importantly 
can be learned and put into practice. People are not born innately moral and ethical. 
Morality is not a gift from the god(s). As Edward Slingerland has pointed out people 
also have a propensity for seriously violent, harmful emotions and behaviors.13 This 
is not to say that there are no organic dispositions or propensities that allow for 
people=s moral and ethical development. The Mammalian disposition to play and to 
care for their young allows creatures to consider the feelings of others. The organic 
dispositions are not sufficient in and of themselves to generate moral feelings and 
behaviors. If we believe that an innate ability does not require further development, 
then we destroy ourselves (see Mencius 2A:6). People must be instructed in the art of 
being moral and they must be taught how to engage in critical, ethical problem 
solving so that they do not become captive to a narrow belief system or a culturally 
relative belief system. After being born with organic dispositions to behave and 
choose in certain ways, people need to be raised, trained and educated in a culture and 
society mostly composed of morally responsible persons. As such moral and ethical 
development cannot be separated from the project of person-making. 
Building on the work of Eliot Deutsch, I want to argue that person-making is the 
process of appropriating our biological, environmental and cultural givens in an 
articulated or artful manner such that a person manifests personal and cultural 
potentials, ultimately participating in the achievement of transcultural person-making 
or personhood.14 I have argued that ritual and the performance of ritual-actions play 
an important role in our personal development, in our transformative experiences, and 
                                               
13 “Mencius’ particular picture of this shared taste may be overly rosy: a more extensive, well 
rounded account of innate human emotions . . . would have to include our propensity for 
horrific out-group violence; our powerful desires for wealth, power, comfort and sex; and the 
prevalence for opportunistic selfishness and convenient self-deception.” Edward Slingerland. 
2011. “ ‘Of what use are the Odes?’ Cognitive Science, Virtue Ethics and Early Confucian 
Ethics,” Philosophy East and West, 61/1, 880-109, p. 98. 
14 Eliot Deutsch. 1982. Personhood, Creativity, and Freedom. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, chs. 1, 3, and 5. Eliot Deutsch. 1992. Creative Being: The Crafting of Person and World. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
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that ritual allows for the creative achievement of personhood.
15
 To be moral and 
ethical as noted above persons must be able to act freely. Ritual actions, and other 
performance opportunities provide a venue for acting freely. In dealing with a more 
general question of how an action can be performed such that the action and the actor 
realize their highest potential, Deutsch gives the following definition of acting 
freely:16 
To act freely means to act skillfully in fulfillment of the natural grace manifest in 
every action-related process and thereby to attain an effortless power. To act freely is 
to express the achievement of personhood; it is to be self-expressive in action. 
Deutsch goes on to give a careful analysis of the terms “skillful,” “natural grace,” 
and “effortless power.” It is not a coincidence that Deutsch=s analysis of Afreedom@ 
parallels and has similar phrasing to that of Victor Turner’s analysis of 
Csikszentmihalyi and MacAloon’s coinage “flowing” which Turner likens to his own 
description of “communitas.” There is an important link between comparative 
philosophy and anthropology when Turner compares communitas with D.T. Suzuki’s 
discussion of wisdom (prajñ). 17  Freedom, flowing, communitas, prajñ, satori, 
nirvāṇa, moksha, ritual, play, acting-as-if, these terms describe some of the respective 
processes in the achievement of person-making. The practice of moral actions and the 
development of ethical problem solving skills require the achievement of 
person-making. 
In a world of bipolar, nondual, interpenetrating and interrelated opposites, wealth, 
material well-being, and moral values are dialectically interlocked. Without material 
well-being, without some level of wealth, persons cannot afford to be moral or ethical. 
That is to say that people who are trying to survive, people who are on the brink of 
starvation or being killed will not be able to override organic drives to survive in 
order to perform moral or ethical acts. They do not have sufficient freedom to be 
moral. However, most people who perform immoral acts are not living on the brink of 
starvation or annihilation. So why are they so easily motivated not to do the right 
thing? 
It has been noted by psychologists that people often feel threatened by the 
challenges of modern life such that they have the impression that their lives are being 
threatened.18 The “dog eat dog” mentality of today’s capitalism and general business 
practices leave people feeling as if they are on the brink of starvation or annihilation, 
                                               
15 James Sellmann. 1997. “Achieving Person Through Ritual,” Asian Culture Quarterly, 
XXV/2, Summer. 
16 Deutsch. 1982. Personhood, Creativity and Freedom, p. 116. 
17  Victor Turner. 1982. From Ritual to Theatre. New York: Performing Arts Journal 
Publications, pp. 55-58, and Victor Turner. 1976. “Social Drama and Ritual Metaphors,” in 
Richard Schechner and Mady Schuman, eds., Ritual, Play and Performance. New York: The 
Seabury Press, pp. 112-116. 
18 The idea that peoples’ stress leads or misleads them to believe that their lives are being 
threatened is made in different ways in various disciplines. For example see, Livia Kohn. 2008. 
Chinese Healing Exercises: The Tradition of Daoyin. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 
22-23. And see, Robert Kegan and Lisa L. Lahey. 2001. How the Way We Talk Can Chang the 
Way We Work: Seven Languages for Transformation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; pp. 2-7. 
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when in fact they are living comfortably. A person who is actively engaged in the 
achievement of person-making becomes aware of the biological, organic “fight or 
flight” reaction to stress in order to act freely, creatively and ethically. The higher 
values of moralities and ethics can be and are achieved through the transformative 
experiences of person-making. Therefore, by valuing what is fitting in the ancient 
traditions, modern people can learn to improve themselves and their moral actions. 
